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Fiscal Deficits, Exchange Rate Crises and Inflation
ABSTRACT
The analysis focuses on the government budget constraint and the
resolution of inconsistent implications of different policy instrucments under
that constraint. We show how, under floating exchange rates, external shocks
or internal structural reforms may cause jumps in inflation and the exchange
rate through their impact on the government budget. In order to achieve a
sustainable reduction in inflation an exchange rate freeze or crawling peg is
shown to require restrictions not only on domestic credit, but also on the
rate of increase in interest—bearing public debt. We endogenize regime
collapse by introducing rational speculation against the central bank, and
show that if an exchange rate freeze collapses, post—collapse inflation will
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This paper deals with inflation, fiscal deficits and exchange rate
policy in high—inflation countries. Recent inflationary experience in
countries like Israel, Argentina and Brazil cannot be explained using
traditional views on the relation between macroeconomic policy and
inflation. Those views coagulate around Keynesian demand pressure or a
monetarist focus on the rate of money growth. Keynesian views cannot explain
the peculiar "plateau" character of inflation in those countries: inflation
is often stable at a given rate for several years, suddenly jumps to a new
plateau, stays there for some years, then jumps again and so on. This pattern
is documented in Bruno (1984), Bruno and Fischer (1984) and Cardoso (1985).
Demand pressure would lead one to expect accelerating inflation.
Simple monetarist views are discounted by the absence of a clear
link between increases in inflation and prior or simultaneous increases in the
money supply (Bental and Eckstein (1985)). Indeed there is evidenceof
occasional perverse links, with inflation accelerating after a tightening of
monetary conditions (Israel 1979, Turkey 1984).
Another puzzle concerns the unhappy experience of countries
attempting to stabilize inflation through an exchange rate freeze or,
similarly, a preannounced slowdown in its rate of change. The experiments
along those lines in Latin America in the late seventies and in Israel in
1982/1983 not only ended in failure, but all countries involved saw inflation
accelerate after the collapse of the experiment to levels well above those
observed before the stabilization program started.
A case in point is the Israeli experience in 1982—1984. Inflation
before the initiation of the exchange rate freeze was 7 percent per month (125
percent annually, continuously compounded). Then, in September 1982, aSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 2
preannounced crawling peg policy was instituted, under which the nominal
exchange rate was devalued at a rate of five percent per month independent of
domestic price developments. The stabilization—program collapsed in October
1983, after which the inflation rate rapidly increased to reach 12—15 percent
per month (15 percent per month implies a 435 percent annual rate!).
A final puzzle concerns the relation between upward jumps in
inflation and Balance of Payment crises. Liviatian and Piterman (1984) have
drawn attention to the fact that in Israel each jump in the inflation rate was
preceded by a BoP crisis, often forcing a change in exchange rate policy.
Similar observations have been made informally for Brazil. This relation is a
puzzle, since a BoP crisis can explain a price level shift where it resulted
in a large devaluation, but not a sustained increase in inflation rates.
In this paper we suggest an explanation for these phenomena drawing
on the "public finance approach" to inflation introduced by Phelps (1973),
without any recourse to irrational behaviour or arbitrary expectation
mechanisms and without introducing unexplained "inertia" into the system.
Our approach draws on several strands in the recent literature which
have until now remained separate. First of all, several closed economy
applications of the Phelps approach to inflation have analyzed the effects of
unsustainable monetary policies under the assumption of an exogenous future
regime switch, restoring consistency between fiscal and monetary policy
(Sargent and Wallace (1982), Liviatan (1984), Bental and Eckstein (1985).
Drazen and Helpman (1985 a, b) extend this literature by introducing
uncertainty with respect to both timing and nature of the regime switch; both
remain exogenous however. We introduce open economy considerations to study
exchange rate policy and, in a departure from this literature, we endogenize
the regime switch by linking it torational speculative behaviour.SVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 3
The introduction of rational speculators forcing a regime switch in
our paper draws on the Literature on speculative attacks on Central Bank
foreign reserves: Krugman (1979), Flood and Carber (1984) and Bianco and
Garber (1986). They, in turn, build on an earlier analysis of the sustaina—
bility of commodity price stabilization schemes (Salant and Henderson (1978),
Salant (1983); see also Flood and Carber (1980). However, that literature
typically ignores the intertemporal budget constraint faced by the public
sector, a constraint that plays a crucial role in our analysis and drives
several of the results.
Finally, since we analyze a switch to a fixed exchange rate (or
preannounced crawling peg) regime, one should mention the "crawling peg"
literature instigated by Diaz Alejandro's description of the Southern Cone
experience (Diaz Alejandro (1979); Calvo (1980), Dornbusch (1980), Obstfeld
(1985), van Wijnbergen (1979, 1986) and many others). That literature, in a
step backwards from Krugman (1979), invariably assumes an exogenousswitching
point if consistency between different policy instruments is analyzed at all.
We present a simple open economy model where consumers base inter—
temporal expenditure plans and asset market demands on rational optimizing
behaviour. They have perfect foresight and fully incorporate their budget
constraint and the budget constraint faced by the public sector.
We use this model to analyze the response of the economy under a
floating exchange rate regime to various policy induced and external shocks;
we then analyze the transition to a fixed exchange rate regime, discuss
sustainability, and demonstrate what happens when policy measures are
inconsistent and the fixed regime unsustainable.
In the introductory part of the paper, we show how higher worldreal
interest rates will increase inflation in the presence of external governmentSVD/SV—041/O1-06--87 4
debt (Brazil 1981—85 ?) under floating exchange rates. Also, we show how
restrictive monetary policies inconsistent with the intertemporal budget
constraint will lead to a depreciation and permanently higher inflation,
similar to the closed economy results of Sargent and Wallace (1982).
Our main results, however, concern the exchange rate freeze
experiment. We analyze conditions under which a collapse will occur and show
that, if a collapse occurs, post—collapse inflation will exceed the inflation
rate that obtained just before the start of the stabilization experiment.
We also show that restricting domestic credit growth to a rate that
will prevent reserve outflows during a freeze is not sufficient to prevent a
speculative attack, contrary to suggestions in Krugman (1979) and Flood and
Garber (1984). In fact we demonstrate that the post—collapse inflation will
be even higher when the public sector follows such a credit policy, covering
the remainder of the deficit by public debt issue; higher, that is, than the
post—collapse inflation rate that obtains after a policy of covering the
deficit through credit creation alone.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present our basic model under the assumption of a floating exchange rate. To
demonstrate the structure of the model, we analyze the effects on inflation
and on the level of the exchange rate of an increase in world interest rates
and of a temporary reduction in money growth.In Section 3 we set up a fixed
exchange rate version. The main part of the paper is Section 4. There we
analyze the transition to a fixed exchange rate (Or crawling peg) regime,
discuss sustainability and exchange rate crises and characterize the post
collapse equilibrium.SVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 5
2. Floating Exchange Rates
2.1 Model Structure
The model is simplified as much as is possible without losing what I
consider essential for the problem at hand; generality is sacrificed for
analytical clarity. Thus there is only one good whose world price is
normalized to one with the domestic price therefore equalling e (thenominal
exchange rate, units of local per unit of foreign currency); home output is
exogenous and constant over time; asset choice for domestic residents is
restricted to domestic money m =M/eand foreign bonds b yielding an
instantaneous rate of return r; and accumulation of physical capital is
ignored.
Consumers derive instantaneous welfare from consumption of goods
c, and from real money holdings m:
=logu (c,m)
where u is homogenous of degree one. The form of iimpliesan intertemporal
substitution elasticity equal to one. We furthermore assume that Ucm0.
Note that this implies:
U U - —cm
cm 2
u(c ,m)
It is possible to construct transaction technologies that are equivalent to
this money in the utility function approach (Chamley (1985), Feenstra (1985)).
We follow Blanchard (1985) in assuming a simple overlapping
generations structure where each individual alive today faces a time and age
independent instantaneous probability of death p !.Thisimplies anSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 6
unconditional rate of time preference + p where pisthe rate of time
preference conditional on staying alive (Blanchard (1985)). We furthermore
follow Blanchard (1985) in assuming that consumers annuitize their non—human
wealth at actuarily fair rates.
Consumers maximize the integral of current and discounted future
welfare subject to the savings identity, the condition that holdings ofmoney
and foreign bonds cannot exceed wealth (of course equality always obtains) and
the intertemporal budget constraints. The latter plus the savings identity is
equivalent to that savings condition and a limiting condition on wealth
—(r+p)t w : urn e w(t) =0 t
Themaximization problem then becomes
—(p+p)t
max fe log u (c,m) (1)
c,m,b 0
s t(a)w =rb+pw+ y —T — itm—c
=(r+p)w + y —-r—c—im
(b) wm + b
—(r + p)t
(c) lim e w(t) 0
t-=
wherei is the nominal interest rate and itthe inflation rate (note that
it =e ,therate of change in the exchange rate e). Thus, i =r+ it
The first order conditions to (1) yield, after routine manipulation,
the following expressions describing consumer behaviour:
u (m) m=1 (2) u (c)
c




where Trepresentstax payments, assumed constant over time. Aggregation
over all individuals alive leaves (2) and (3) unaffected but changes (4).
Define aggregate wealth V as
t p(s —t)
V(t) =Iw(s,t) p e ds
-
withw (s,t) wealth at time t of individuals born at s.It is straightforward
to show that (3) and (4) imply
V =(r—p) (y—r)+(r—p — p) V
(5) r+p
where convergence of the integral defining V requires r <o + p
(Blanchard (1985)). (2), (3) ai-id (5) completely describe private behaviour.
Remains the introduction of the government budget constraint and the
description of government policies.
The public sector consists of a government proper and a central
bank. The central bank implements the exchange rate policy decreed by the
government; under a floating regime it does not intervene in foreign exchange
markets, and it buys and sells foreign exchange as needed under any other
regime. It furthermore incurs no administrative costs and transfers its
profits to the government. Its profits equal rR with R the level of foreign
reserves measured in foreign currency terms. The central bank earns the same
rate on its foreign assets as the private sector. (Obstfeld (1981) stresses
the importance of properly keeping track of central bank interest earnings).SVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 8
The government budget constraint equals:
g + r(d —R)—T= +ri + urn (6)
g is real government expenditure and r real tax revenue, both of which
are constant in all policy experiments discussed in this paper. Under
floating rates, R too is constant; d is foreign debt of the government. We
assume, for simplicity only, that the government issues no domestic interest
bearing liabilities. Like in Drazen and Helpman (1985 a, b), there is a
maximum Level of government debt that can be supported in steady state since g
cannot fall below zero and there are limits to the revenues that can be raised
through t and the inflation tax in steady state. Call this level dV'. We
will assume, following Drazen and Helprnan (1985 a, b) and Kharas (1984), that
no rational lender will lend beyond d'. The intertemporal budget constraint
for the government will thus always be satisfied (that constraint implies
lim e —rt d(t) =0).
We can analyze the working of the model once we have specified the
funding policy of the government. We will throughout this paper assume g and
t to remain constant. Government policy within the context of the floating
rate regime therefore implies a choice of d .Considerfirst the case of
d =0,i.e. full monetary financing of the "basic" deficit g —T+ r(d —R).
In that case the model boils down to:
u (m)/u (c) r + u (7 a) m c
c + im(o + p) (V + (y —r)/(r+ p)) (7b)SVD/SV—041/01—06—87 9





—T + r(d—R)—rm (9)
(7a,b) can be used to derive expressions for c and conditional on m, V
and r c =c(m,V; and it= it(m,V; r) "+"or"—"indicatesthe sign
of the corresponding partial derivatives. Analytical expressions are in
Appendix A.
Insertion of (7 a, b) into (8) and (9) yields two dynamic equations:
V =V(m,V; r) (10)
=m(m,v; r) (11)
+— +
Onceagain, analytical expressions are in Appendix A, but note from those
expressions that
m m (1 —c)
m it
with the general equilibrium elasticity of real money demand with respect
to it.Herewe only discuss the equilibrium where <1and rn >0,
i.e. where the economy operates on the upward part of the inflation tax Laffer
curve.
Consider equations (10) and (11) around the equilibrium where
rn < .(10)represents a vertical curve in m —Vspace (locus VV inSVD/SV—04l/01—06—87 10
fig. 1), steady state non—human wealth V depends exclusively on human
wealthy —r,thereal interest rate r, the rate of time preference p
and the decay parameter p. Note that V may be negative or positive,
depending on whether p is greater or smaller than r (this is also pointed
Out in Blanchard (1985)).V <0 corresponds to external debt in excess
of the real value of the monetary base. Since (0unambiguously, V is
falling to the right of the VV —locusand rising to the left of it (see
fig. 1).
The slope of the MM curve (along which r0 )isunambiguously







Also, as long as m < ,m>0and MM therefore slopes up.In that case
real money balances will be rising above and falling below MM (see fig. 1).
The system is thus saddlepoint stable around the equilibrium E (see Appendix A
for a formal analysis).
Standard techniques show that the slope of the saddle path is
positive and less than the slope of MM around E. The slope will be less than
one for c <1 ,aslightly stronger condition than Em < 1(again see the
appendix for formal analysis).SVD/SV—041/O1—06--87 ii
Figure 1




2.2 Response to External and to Policy Induced Shocks
Partly to see the mechanics of the model and partly for their own
right, consider two shocks to the system. First an increase in world interest
rates, dr >0
A permanently lower interest rate will shift KM down and VV out:
-m -
=r<0;3V r>0 (13) 3r 3r — m - v VV
where we used the expressions for partials listed in Appendix A.2.
Accordingly in steady state, V will increase and rn may go up or down. It
is straightforward to show that for a large enough public foreign debt d,rn
will fall, the case depicted in Figure 2.
The original equilibrium was at A, the new one is at B fig. 2.
Therefore, at the moment of the reform a jump will take place towards the new
saddle path. Under floating rates, b can only change gradually over time,
since changes in bhave to match the current account surplus, a flow
variable. Hence a jump (a discrete change in the exchange rate e )will
affectrn and V the same in absolute terms, jumps take place along a 450
line.Thus, the economy moves from A to C initially and then along the saddle
path to B
The downward move in m and V (from A to C) has conflicting effects
on the inflation rate: a lower m is compatible with higher inflation since
u <0; lower wealth on the other hand lowers consumption and thus mm
increases the marginal utility of consumption; equilibrium then requires a
lower inflation rate sinceu lu= j .Infootnote 4 and Appendix Al we m C
showthat sufficiently high initial inflation rates (around 10 or 15 percentSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 13
Figure 2




annually) are sufficient (but not necessary!) to guarantee the dominance of
the money shift. We are discussing countries with triple digit inflation,
so on impact the exchange rate depreciates and the inflation rate jumps up
after the increase in world interest rates. The intuition is straightfor—
ward: higher real interest rates increase the revenue requirements of the
government because of increased interest payments on foreign debt (rd)
The higher inflation will raise revenues through its effect on the inflation
tax.
Consider next a temporary decline in money growth with increased
debt issue temporarily replacing seignorage:
O￿t <T : dy
t￿T:d=O
This has two effects in the diagrammatic analysis. On impact, rnis reduced
by yonefor one through the higher debt issue
0 ￿ t< T:rn =g—T+ r(d—R)—-rim—y





After T, d 0 again and the shift will be reversed; however government debt
has by then gone up by yT and debt service requirements therefore by
ryT. Hence in the long run (t >T),KM shifts down compared to A by:
m m
—ryTm =—ryTii(O)(1 ) I E
m n iT
Thenet effect is given in fig. 3. The pre—shock equilibrium is A, the MN
curve shifts up on impact to cross VV at B, and down after T to settle at C.
From the dynamics plus the requirement to jump along the 450 line,
one can check that the economy will jump to D, to be able to reach the new
"post —T" saddle path at time T (point E in fig. 3). Inflation will
accelerate on impact; rise further between 0 and T ( >0, >0;r < 0
and <0); and may rise or fall after T until reaching a new steady state
at C at a permanently higher inflation rate than prevailed at A (fig. 4).
We thus mimic the surprising Sargent—Wallace result of an increase
in inflation (rate of depreciation of the exchange rate) both on impact and
permanently, in response to temporary tight money accompanied by increased
issue of interest bearing debt. Moreover, the exchange rate depreciates
discretely on impact. V
3.The Model under Fixed Exchange Rates
If we could ignore sustainability issues (and of course we cannot;
that is the subject of Section 4), the model equations would need only minor
adjustment to describe developments under a fixed exchange rate regime. This
is because we use a competitive framework where consumers are price takers;
whether prices are supported by one or another type of exchange rate regime is
of no importance. Sustainabiliiy introduces Krugman (1979)—type speculativeSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 16
Figure 3






Figures 4a and 4b
Inflation Response to Temporary Tightening of Monetary Policy.









attack issues and the regime switch such attacks force. In this section we
will show how to check whether such attacks will take place or not but not yet
introduce the attack itself in the analysis; that will be done in Section 4
where we discuss the use of an exchange rate freeze as an anti—inflation
device.
Since consumers are price takers, (7 a, b) and (8) will continue to
describe private behaviour. Note that now (7a), for any given value of
consumption c, determines the equilibrium moneystock m. This is because under
a fixed exchange rate regime,iisexogenous (under a preannounced crawling
peg regime it might be non—zero, but the point is that it is fixed). Hence we
can use (7b) to substitute out c from (7a) and obtain an equilibrium relation





(14) defines the MD locus in fig. 5; as long as the fixed exchange
regime lasts, the economy has to be on that locus. The slope of that locus
equals the marginal propensity to hold money out of wealth:
(p+p)u /u
am= cc c >0 (15) (r+)(u /u)+(u /u) MD cc c mm m
where we repeatedly used u /u=r+it
m CSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 19
Figure 5:
The Fixed Exchange Rate Regime
a
vvSVD/SV—041/0l—06—87 20
Of course, the location of the curve shifts if the preannounced rate
of crawl is changed, changing iTone for one:
am — —[(r + Am + 1]
MD [(t + it) (A (r + ) — UrTim/
Urn)] v=
with A =—uI u > 0 .Notethat (16) is simply the inverse of the cc C
expression for itderived in Appendix A.l.
Finally, as to the intersection of MD and VV, let us anticipate the
experiment performed in Section 4, a transition from a high inflation floating
regime to a low inflation (say zero) fixed rate regime. In that case we know
that (14) will not be satisfied at the old equilibrium values for m and V (say
mA and VA; see fig. 5). At A, um(mA) I Uc(c(mA, VA)) will equal r +
but during the freeze =0"itA Accordingly, for given V, m will
increase as itdecreases (Appendix A.1). Hence after a freeze reducing
it to zero instantaneously, MD shifts up from A to, say, B in fig. 5.
The government budget constraint will tell us whether the exchange
rate freeze is feasible or not.It needs a minor amendment, since under fixed
exchange rates the issue of new non—interest bearing government liabilities
does not necessarily equal the increase in the nominal moneystockanymore.
Central bank foreign assets may change and so drive a wedge between changes in
nominal money and changes in credit to the government.
Call the stock of non—interest bearing domestic government
liabilities C. The government budget constraint then becomes:
g —T+ r (d —R)= + (17)SVD/SV—041/O1-06—87 21
Note that R now may vary over time.
Equations (7a, b) and (8) fully specify the dynamic path of m under
this exchange rate regime. The desired (and actual, given our assumptions of
perfect capital mobility and, in this section, predetermined exchange rates)
nominal increase in money hence equals
(18)
with m and im determined from (7a, b) and (8) and the policy choice of the
rate of crawl.




A fixed exchange rate regime needs to pass two tests of sustain
ability. The first test follows from the fact that for any debt policy
defining a time path for and thus d, reserve losses cannot continue
indefinitely. Although a central bank can borrow, it too will face a debt
ceiling for the same reason that d cannot exceed d* (see Section 2).
The second test is that even where the time path of R satisfies the
first test, the time path of d and d that supports it should not imply that
d will eventually exceed d'. In the next section we will consider both types
of sustainability failures and show that they lead to different post—collapse
inflation rates; both however will be in excess of the inflation rate
prevailing before the collapse.SVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 22
4. An Exchange Rate Freeze, Speculative Attacks and the Post—Collapse
Inflation Rate -
Considernow the effects of freezing the exchange rate. We will do
so under two alternative assumptions about the mix of interest bearing debt
and non—interest—bearing liabilities the public sector uses to fund its "basic
deficit" g —t+ r (d —R) .Underthe first assumption, no further
increase in external public debt is allowed (a= 0); the entire basic
budget deficit is funded through issuing domestic credit. In the second case
we assume that domestic credit policy is designed to avoid gradual reserve
losses during the period that the freeze is operating, rather along the lines
of a standard IMF program. External borrowing is used to fill thegap. We
show that the two strategies lead to different post—collapse equilibria: the
tight—credit approach will lead to higher inflation eventually, through the
eroding effect of higher external debt on the basic budget balance of the
public sector.
4.1 An Exchange Rate Freeze with d0 Imposed
We already saw that an exchange rate freeze (or a preannounced
crawling peg at a rate below the pre—stabilization—program inflation rate)
shifts up the MD locus, say from A to B in fig. 6 a, b.
The impact response of the economy to any shock is different under
fixed and floating rates. Under floating rates, b can change only gradually,
since it needs to match the Current Account Balance, a flow variable. Stock
adjustment takes place through discrete jumps in the exchange rate, leading to
discrete changes in m (since M too can only change gradually under that
regime). Since V =m+ b, discrete changes take place along a 450 line
through the starting point.SVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 23
Under fixed rates however, discrete changes take place through a
different mechanism. e is fixed by assumption, so Central Bank reserves are
not necessarily fixed anymore. Instead discrete changes are effected through
one for one swaps between m and b: the public can buy discrete quantities of
foreign exchange from the Central Bank in order to purchase foreign assets
with the CB losing an equivalent amount of foreign reserves; or, in the other
direction, the public will deposit foreign currency obtained from the sale of
units of b in the banking system to require domestic money, so increasing the
CB's foreign assets and the monetary base m. Hence under fixed rates jumps
take place vertically maintaining V while m changes, and with reserves R going
through a matching stock adjustment during the jump.
Call the level of CB reserves available at the moment of the
announcement of the stabilization program RA .Afterthe start of the
program, a vertical jump to move to the MD curve will bring the economy from A
to B (fig. 6a, b): a discrete inflow of Central Bank Reserves (the
counterpart of which is a private sale of foreign assets or increase in
foreign borrowing) expands the money supply from mA to mB, where it is in line
with the new lower inflation rate B equals zero in the case of an
actual "freeze").
To see whether a fixed rate regime at B is sustainable, we need to
inspect the government budget constraint and check whether the implied rate of
domestic credit issue is compatible with the increase in nominal money demand
that arises when the economy stays at B.
Consider therefore equ. (17) and (18). We know that, since the
economy was in equilibrium at A:SVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 24






a regime switch after
gradual reserve losses


















has taken place, so
at B profit transfers by the CB into the government budget have increased by
r tR .Onthe other hand the private sector will absorb domestic credit at
the rate TTB mB anything higher will cause unsustainable reserve losses.





Using (20) we get
—
tA










Since <1around A and more so around B (see the discussion of the slope
of the saddle path in Appendix A.3).
Hence the situation at B is not sustainable, the initial reserve
inflow will be followed by a period of reserve losses:SVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 26
(t) ='BmB —1A
mA < 0 (22)
for t > 0 until the regime is abandoned.
This is exactly the type of situation analyzed in Krugman (1979).
Krugman shows that it leads to a speculative attack on the exchange rate
regime, exhausting the Central Bank's foreign exchange reserves, thus forcing
a return to floating exchange rates. We can use our diagrammatic framework to
analyze the timing of the attack and the post—attack equilibrium.
Before doing that, however, we draw attention to an important issue
not covered in the speculative attack literature: a speculative attack will
exhaust the Central Bank's reserves and thus reduce its post—collapse profits
from interest earnings on foreign assets to zero; as a consequence, this
positive contribution to the government budget comes to an end after the
collapse and the government's basic budget balance deteriorates not only with
respect to B, but even with respect to the pre—stabilization situation at A.
Call the post—collapse situation C, then:




The first equality obtains because a speculative attack exhausts the CB's
reserves, hence Rc =0.Therefore,the post—collapse equilibrium will not
be at A but lower, since the basic budget deficit has deteriorated by r
RA.








A it A it
= rR
where is a positive constant defined for later use.
The post—collapse equilibrium will be at C, below the pre—stabilization








>it (m,VA) since mA m,m
0
This establishes an important result: if the crawling peg or
exchange rate freeze ends through a speculative attack a la Krugman (1979),
the post—collapse inflation rate will exceed the inflation rate that prevailed
before the start of the stabilization program.
Consider finally the timing of the speculative attack. Figures 6a
and 6b look at two extremes. At the one end is the case where no attack takes
place and the regime changes when CB reserves have been exhausted through the
gradual outflow given in (22) (Figure 6b).SVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 28
In that case R0 at the time of the regime change so no outflow
takes place and on impact no vertical jump takes place. However in the post—
collapse float, the economy will need to remain on the saddle path passing
through C. Hence immediately after R reaches zero and the CB abandons the
fixed rate regime, a discrete devaluation takes place, taking the economy from
B to D in fig. 6b. However such a devaluation would inflict capital losses at
an infinite rate on holders of domestic money. Rational speculators will
therefore bring down the regime before that occurs (Krugman (1979)).
On the other extreme is a speculative attack at the very beginning
of the freeze, immediately after the economy has jumped to B. That is the
case depicted in fig. 6a. Such a speculative attack will exhaust Central Bank
reserves and therefore instantaneously reduce the money stock by an equal
amount. Since RA is positive, the attack at that time will move the economy
down below A. What we do not know is whether it will move below C. The
downward shift equals RA + 1R ,whilethe distance B —Cequals
r+ R
Therefore the attack will take the economy below C if< r (fig. 6a).
Consider that case first.
After the attack the economy moves below C since by assumption
< r
1
Hence, after the float starts, the economy is below the saddlepath
on which it should be. Accordingly the exchange rate will immediately
appreciate, moving the economy from D to E. It will then gradually depreciate
back down to C. This scenario would however also be incompatible with
rational and competitive speculative behaviour: speculators would have moved
Out of domestic currency at the very moment holding on would have yieldedSVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 29
capital gains at an infinite rate during the jump. Instead forcing the jump
from D to E implies losses at an infinite rate.
The existence of competitive rational speculators will lead to a
speculative attack timed to fall in between these two ex:remes, in such a way
that no discrete depreciation will take place and therefore no infinite rate
of capital gain will occur.
We can easily calculate the timing of the attack. The only way such
a discrete change could be avoided is if the economy would be forced to jump
to C in the process of exhausting the CB's foreign reserves. That suggests
that the time of the attack is determined by the following equation (where










(28)is an implicit equation in T, the time of the attack.






In that case an initial jump at t=0would fall short of C and also produce a
depreciation, like in fig. 6b, although a smaller one (see fig. 6c below). In
that case a speculative attack will abort the freeze straight at the beginning.SVD/SV—041/01—06—87 30
4.2 An exchange Rate Freeze with d Set to Avoid Cradual Reserve
Losses While theFreeze Operates.
Consider finally a freeze backed up by a domestic credit policy
designed to avoid reserve losses, i.e. a time path of C that would keep
=0in (22). This is very much the type of credit policy imposed during IMF
administered adjustment programs •,




for as long as the freeze Lasts. This in turn will, in the absence of a
speculative atack, lead to a steady increase in external debt until the maximum
level d is reached. Then the policy will need to be discontinued and, if
there still is no speculative attack, the economy is back to the situation
analyzed in Section 4.1, and an attack will bring the regime down in the manner
discribed in Section 4.1.
There is, however, one important difference. In the process, public
sector external debt has increased from dA to dj'. Hence the downward shift of









>r1; the Speculative Attack Occurs Immediately





We will not take the reader through the mechanics of calculating the timing of
the attack, but point out that equation (30) implies that the post—collapse
equilibrium with a tighter domestic credit policy before and hence a higher
public interest bearing debt afterwards, will be below C, say at F, and will
therefore be characterized by an even higher inflation rate:
(me,, VF) = (mb,, VB) (31)
>ii (me,VB)
+'VA)
We leave it to the reader to show that that attack can take place
before d" will have been reached (the necessary formulas are given in
footnote 7) As a final observation, note that if it takes place before d"
is reached, the speculative attack will take place without any gradual loss of
Central Bank foreign reserves. The conditions that will prevent an attack
derived in Krugman (1979) and Flood and Garber (1984) are, therefore, necessary
but not sufficient. In addition conditions need to be satisfied on the growth
rate of interest bearing public sector debt.
One qualifying remark is in order, however. The internal logic of
the paper suggests that, in a crisis, a Central Bank should be able to obtain
foreign loans equal to d" —d(note that R disappears during the crisis). This
opportunity, if used, would make the post—collapse public sector debt equal to
d' irrespective of the domestic credit policy followed prior to the collapse.
In that case the dependence of the post—collapse inflation rate on the pre—
collapse domestic credit policy would disappear.SVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 33
This assumption on foreign Lenders' behavior, while appealing in its
symmetry, seems counterfactual. Recent exchange rate crises in Latin America
strongly suggest that no additional foreign loans will be available at all
during a crisis. This in spite of the fact that lenders might have been
willing to lend more before the crisis atmosphere took hold, and have been
observed to lend more afterwards. The implication of such behavior is that the
maximum reserve loss during a crisis equals gross reserves of the Central
Bank. Since we assume that the fiscal authorities conduct all public sector
foreign borrowing, dross reserves of the CB equal its net foreign reserves;
hence our assumption that R is reduced to zero during a speculative attack.
5. Conclusions
In the introduction we summarized a series of puzzles in the recent
inflationary experience of high inflation countries and stabilization failures
in countries such as Israel, Brazil and Argentina. In this paper we present an
analysis that explains these puzzles within the context of a model with
rational, optimizing and forward looking consumers endowed with perfect
foresight. The government budget constraint and the resolution of
inconsistencies between the implications of different policy instruments for
that constraint are at the core of our analysis.
In doing so this paper is in the spirit of the "public finance
approach" to macroeconomics popularized by Phelps (1973). Several authors have
recently used this approach to analyze current effects of future policy changes
(Sargent and Wallace (1982), Liviatan (1984), Drazen and Helpman (1985 a, b),
Bental and Eckstein (1985)).In a departure from those papers, we endogenize
the regime switch by linking it to rational speculative behaviour.
Furthermore, we extend this approach to an open economy framework (all papersSVD/SV—041/O1--06—87 34
mentioned used closed economy models) which enables us to analyze exchange rate
policy and changes in exchange rate regime.
After setting up a floating exchange rate version of our model, we
show how external shocks such as increases in world interest rates lead to a
deterioration of the government deficit in the presence of external public
debt. We demonstrate how this will lead to a higher inflation rate through the
residual roLe of the inflation tax in a floating exchange rate regime.
Such shocks to the basic budget position of the public sector (and
one can think of many other shocks that would have similar effects) can
therefore explain sudden increases in inflation rates that will then stay at
these higher rates unless offsetting cuts in expenditures or increases in real
taxes are instigated. This explains the first puzzle mentioned in the
introduction, the "plateau —pattern"of inflation observed in countries like
Israel and Brazil.
We then introduce a fixed exchange rate version of the model and
proceed to the main part of the paper, an analysis of the use of an exchange
rate freeze (or preannounced crawling peg) in an attempt to reduce the rate of
inflation, as was done in Israel in October 1982 and Argentina from December 78
onwards. We derive conditions that need to be satisfied for such an experiment
to be sustainable. These conditions are derived from the government budget
:onstraint. In particular we show that a domestic credit issuance policy
designed to offset loss of international reserves while the fixed regime lasts,
is necessary but not sufficient to prevent speculative attacks in fixed
exchange rate regimes (Krugrnan (1979), Flood and Garber (1984) focus on reserve
losses only). The difference arises because we explicitly incorporate the
government budget constraint. We show that speculative attacks will also takeSVD/SV—041/Ol—O6—87 35
place if such a domestic credit policy implies unsustainable increases in
interest bearing (non—monetary) government debt.
We show that, if a collapse occurs, the post—collapse inflation rate
is higher than the inflation rate that prevailed prior to the stabilization
experiment. This accords well with Argentinian and Israeli experience. The
explanation is rather subtle and is related to the loss of interest earnings on
the foreign assets of the Central Bank that are lost during the speculative
attack, and the ensuing decline in profit transfers from the Central Bank into -
thegovernment budget.
This result also sheds light on another one of the puzzles brought up
in the introduction, the link between jumps in inflation and BoP crises.
Increases in inflation will follow the exchange rate crises because of the
underlying deterioration of the government budget constraint. Both the crisis
and the subsequent increase in inflation are triggered by basic fiscal policy
inconsistencies; their simultaneous occurrence is therefore not necessary an
argument against the theory linking inflation to fiscal policy.
We then endogenize such speculative attacks following Krugman
(1979). We show that if a collapse occurs after a domestic credit policy,
during the exchange rate freeze, that is designed to prevent reserve losses
while the freeze lasts, will lead to a higher post—collapse inflation rate than
wilL prevail when domestic credit issuance is higher during the freeze period,
high enough to keep external public debt at the pre—freeze level. The
explanation is the post—collapse deterioration in the basic government budget
because of higher real interest payments on the extra external debt accumulated
under the first policy. Moreover, under the first, restrictive domestic credit
policy, a speculative attack will take place without any Central Bank foreignSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 36
reserve losses prior to the attack (there wiLl be such losses during the attack
of course).
This ultimately inflationary effect of restrictive credit policies
under an unsustainable fixed exchange rate regime is related to the Sargent—
WalLace (1982) result of high inflation in response to temporary tight money in
a closed economy.
Most of these results are of course conditionaL on the government not
undertaking the reform in government expenditure and (non—inflation) taxes
necessary to make the fixed regime feasible. However, it is important to
realize that, even where the government intends to undertake such reforms in
the future, private doubts on whether these reforms will in fact be imple-
mented, will lead to similar results. This point is made in Drazen and Helpman
(1985 b) in a discussion of monetary policy in a closed economy context. The
policy conclusion is clear: fiscal reform is not only necessary for the
success of anti—inflation programs, but should come up front.SVD/SV—041/0l—06—87 37
Footnotes
1/ This structure is used to guarantee existence of a steady state without
having to impose the arbitrary assumption ofr p Cr is the foreign
real rate and pthe domestic rate of time preference). See also
Frenkel and Razin (1985) and Buiter (1984 b) for open economy applications
of the Blanchard (1985) framework.
2/ Helpman and Razin (1985) discuss the transition from a floating to a fixed
rate exchange regime in a policy setting where taxes t are varied to
insure sustainability of the fixed rate regime. This leads to a set of
issues entirely different from the one discussed in this paper.
3/ Plus other variables and parameters that will not be varied in this paper
and are therefore dropped from the argument list.
4/ii > p + p —ris sufficient but not necessary (cf. Appendix A.2). On an
annual basis, p is constrainted to be below one by definition. For the
population as a whole, p is likely to be around .02 at most. In the
economies we have in mind, itis well above one (100%inflation) at the
time the exchange rate policy was tried (125% in Israel in 1982, around
200% in Argentina in 1978). Of course in practice p is not constant across
ages but seems constant and well below .02 until 50 but to increase steeply
after (Blarichard (1985)). The highest empirical estimate of oI am aware
of (15%; Boskin and Kotlikoff (1985)) would then still imply that an
inflation rate of around 10—15% annually would be high enough. TheSVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 38
necessary condition is weaker, however, as long as U <0 (see
Appendix A.1).
5/ Unless, of course, real government expenditure g is sufficiently cut or
real taxes sufficiently raised concurrently.
6/ In fact the Central Bank might abandon the fixed rate regime before R has
reached zero, say at >0.Clearly Rc <RA,since RA was considered
sufficiently high to actually start the fixed rate regime. We will assume
=0,but all results carry through as long as R <RA.
7/ IMF programs, in addition to ceilings on domestic credit growth, often also
incorporate more fundamental fiscal reforms. That would make the problems
analyzed in this paper less likely to occur.
8/ To give the answer away, the attack takes place before d has been reached
if an attack at the moment d is reached would result in an immediate
depreciation after the attack forced a transition to the floating rate





If this happens, i.e. if an attack ends the freeze before d is reached,
the new equilibrium will be between C and F. Thisis because d(T) <d",SVD/SV—041/O1—0687 39
although d(T) > (unlessthe attack takes place immediately after the
announcement of the freeze, in which case the new equilibrium is at C
again).SVD/SV—041/0l—06—87 40
Appendix A
A.l Derivation ofTI (m,V; r) and C (m, V, r)
Total differentiation of equ. (7a, b) yields:







—(r+ )din+ (+p) dV
with A =—U
1U,the coefficient of absolute risk aversion Define the
determinant of the LHS matrix as A
A (r + it) Am + 1 >0
Hence:
it=- A-l
(r + (A(r +- U /U))<0 m mm m
=A
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(r + it) A (+p) > 0
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(a + p) (y -) <0
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involving 1mcanceiCinCr• necessary condition referred to on p. 14




ir>p+p—r+U /(uA) mm m
A.2 Derivation ofrn (m, V; r) and ' (m, V; r)





=—— rp (p + p) + (r —)2> 0 r+p (r+p)(r—p—p)
The second expression for uses that at V = (steady state value),
(r —p)y—r+ (r —p
—p)V 0 .Ittherefore holds exactly when evaluated
—r+p —
atV ,butonly approximately around VSVD/SV—041/Ol—06—87 42
m =— + )
m m




A.3 Stability of (11), (12) and the slope of the saddle path around E.
The characteristic equation of the matrix of partial derivatives of
rn and '(equ.11, 12) with respect to m, V is:
(x+ mu(1 —cm))(x— (r—p—p))=0 (A2)
Around E, 1 ,hencethe negative root is X = r—p—p .Theother
root, A=— mr(1 —Cm)>0around E, so the system is saddlepoint stable
around E.
Straightforward calculation shows that the eigenvector corresponding
to Aequals
(m, V) =(———, 1)
where Z =m(r +u)A (p +p)>0
andSVD/SV—041/O1—06—87 43
m z =—mit (1—c )—r
1 m it
it m = (1—) — r
m it
C
Clearly,the slope of the saddlepath equals Z /(z+
Z1)
so that the sLope is smaller than one if >0 .Thatin turn implies






m it or c<
itr+it
a slightly stronger condition than c <1,whichwe will assume to hold.
A.4 The other side of the Laffer curve.
If >1 ,asit will be for inflation rates in excess of the
maximum revenue rate, the sign of the first root switches sign:
A =— mit(1 —m)>0 m <
1 m it< it>
Thatimplies that the initial conditions will not be uniquely tied downtwo
negative roots and only one predetermined variable (b; m can jump). We choose
the unique convergent path towards the Low inflation equilibrium.SVD/SV—041/01—06—87 44
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